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WheelHorseman's avatar

I am not sure of the numbers of others, or the strength of their convictions, but my thought is that if the electoral college is somehow eliminated, and we go to straight nationwide vote count, that people who live in "fly over country" would soon feel compelled to revolt because they would essentially become slaves to the citizens of the big, mostly coastal, cities. America as a collection of states would be wiped out, so whether you call it a secession or not, people like myself would fight to escape that. My franchise would become worthless, and I would choose not to live in a nation like that. "Live Free of Die..."

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David's avatar

Having just finished Allen Guelzo's /Fateful Lightning: A New History of the Civil War/, he concludes that after-the-fact "rational analysis" is a waste of time, the more so that--as he demonstrates, to my satisfaction at least--both sides acted with impeccable rationality within the epistemological and hermeneutical frameworks they had to hand.

And lest you think this was driven by extremists or low-information people, there's a famous description by Joshua Chamberlain--then a professor at Bowdoin College--of his dinner with a similarly erudite and scholarly Southerner in 1859. He describes the evening as a feast of wit and spirit (my words, paraphrasing his), at the conclusion of which he took the view that civil war was inexorable.

Historically, war has always been the product of miscalculation: regardless of the other causes, each side misperceives in some way the resolve, capability, or resilience of their adversaries, and conclude that war is a low order of probability. And most of the time, they're right. Unfortunately, sometimes they're spectacularly wrong. I could cite any number of examples but I'll stick to the Civil War.

Guelzo argues that the South was deeply committed to the slave system, and became more so over the course of time. Consequently they brandished secession every time they perceived some action by the North as a threat to the "Peculiar Institution" as they came to call it (side note; Guelzo persuasively argues that the events of the Hartford Convention in 1814 made it difficult for the North to dismiss these Southern threats...the more so that prior to the Civil War the issue of secession had never been litigated or otherwise constitutionally laid to rest).

This approach worked out pretty well for the South in 1820 (Missouri Compromise), 1850 (Compromise of 1850), and 1854 (Kansas-Nebraska Act) but not so well in 1833 (Nullification Crisis) or--of course--in 1861. By then, the 1857 /Dred Scott/ decision threatened to make any future political compromise impossible, especially if--again, as Guelzo suggests--Taney intended to use future cases to eviscerate the anti-slavery laws in the free states as well.

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